Professional self-regulation in a changing architecture of governance: comparing health policy in the UK and Germany by Kuhlmann, Ellen & Allsop, Judith
D
el
iv
er
ed
 b
y 
In
ge
nt
a 
to
: U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f L
in
co
ln
IP
 : 
21
2.
21
9.
22
0.
10
6 
O
n:
 T
ue
, 2
4 
Ja
n 
20
12
 0
9:
35
:4
6
Co
py
rig
ht
  T
he
 P
ol
icy
 P
re
ss
173©	The	Policy	Press,	2008	•	ISSN	0305	5736
Policy & Politics		vol	36		no	2	•	173–89	(2008)
Final	submission	November	2007		•		Acceptance	December	2007
Key	words:	health	policies	•	medical	profession	•	governance	theory	•	comparison	UK	and	Germany
Professional self-regulation in a changing 
architecture of governance: comparing health 
policy in the UK and Germany
Ellen Kuhlmann and Judith Allsop
This	 chapter	 compares	 transformations	 in	 professional	 self-regulation	 in	 the	UK	 and	
Germany	through	the	lens	of	governance.	We	introduce	an	expanded	concept	of	governance	
that	 includes	 national	 configurations	 of	 state–profession	 relationships	 and	 places	 self-
regulation	in	the	context	of	other	forms	of	governance.	The	analysis	shows	that	a	general	
trend	towards	network	governance	plays	out	differently.	In	the	UK,	a	plural	structure	of	
network	governance	and	stakeholder	arrangements	is	emerging	in	the	context	of	state-
led	 change.	 In	Germany,	 partnership	 governance	 between	 sickness	 funds	 and	medical	
associations	shape	the	transformations	and	act	as	a	barrier	towards	the	entry	of	new	
players.
Introduction
Across countries, transformations in the governance of the health professions are 
a significant aspect of new health policies. We can observe a general trend towards 
partnership and network-based governance together with marketisation and 
increased managerial control (Blank and Burau, 2007; Allsop and Jones, 2008). 
Existing systems of professional self-regulation have come under scrutiny, challenging 
the customary dominance of the medical profession in the healthcare division of 
labour and generating considerable scholarly debate (Allsop and Saks, 2002; McKinlay 
and Marceau, 2002; Salter, 2002; Gray and Harrison, 2004; DH, 2006; Hunter, 2006; 
Kuhlmann and Saks, 2008).
This article compares the transformations in professional self-regulation in the UK 
and Germany through the lens of governance. We introduce an expanded concept 
of governance to include national configurations of state–profession relationships 
and place self-regulation in the context of other forms of governance. Our aim is to 
move beyond the controversy over self-regulation as a barrier to the modernisation 
of healthcare and to highlight the complex factors that may block or facilitate change 
in professional governance. We argue that the concept of governance provides an 
opportunity for a more context-sensitive comparison between countries, so we 
can understand better how new health policies play out within the nation-based 
architecture of emergent governance practices. The UK and Germany have been 
chosen as case studies as they allow for the investigation of the dynamics of changing 
governance in the context of similarity and difference. The two countries are similar 
in terms of social, economic and demographic characteristics and the concepts of 
profession and regulation are broadly equivalent. Both countries have mature welfare 
state systems with non-market-based healthcare and a ‘public responsibility’ for 
ensuring that all citizens have access to healthcare. In both, there is a strong tradition 
of professional autonomy and medical dominance in healthcare politics. 
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There are also major areas of difference, in particular in the methods of funding 
and the institutional frameworks for professional governance. The UK has a tax-
funded National Health Service (NHS), the Beveridge model, while the German, or 
Bismarck, model is based on statutory health insurance (SHI) with healthcare jointly 
funded by compulsory contributions from employers and employees. While the 
reform strategies are similar, the emphasis differs and the form of healthcare politics 
creates barriers and facilitators to change that are specific to the two countries. In 
the European context, commentators have noted that the UK healthcare system has 
been in a period of rapid change, while the conservative-corporatist German system 
is a ‘low motion’ system (Freeman, 2000; Burau, 2005). These differences make for 
an interesting case study in which to explore transformations in professional self-
regulation in the wider context of new governance practices.
We begin by discussing the concept of governance and the methodological issues 
that arise in comparing transformations in professional governance, and then move on 
to analyse the policy context by providing an overview of the regulatory structure and 
the main policy drivers for change in the two countries. We aim to compare changes 
in governance in three areas: the reconfiguration of top-down regulatory bodies; 
new models of governing through markets and managerial regimes; and shifts in 
the form of self-regulation. We conclude by highlighting how changing governance 
practices play out in the national configuration of state–profession relations.
Comparing changing professional governance in context: 
theory and method
In our analysis, we aim to link the study of professions to governance theory. A 
particular strength of the concept of governance is its flexibility and focus on the 
intersection of different forms of governance. Newman (2001) has introduced a 
typology of market, hierarchy and networks and highlighted the interplay of sets of 
governance practices. Following her analysis, she argues that:
State power is not dissolved – hierarchical forms of governance remain 
significant – but the idea of the state as a unitary actor is problematised, with 
more emphasis being placed on market mechanisms, network patterns of 
governance (governing through partnership and collaborative strategies), and 
the constitution of citizens as self-governing, responsible subjects. (Newman, 
2005: 81)
Burau and Vrangbæk (2008), in a comparative study of five European health systems, 
also remark on the persistence of hierarchical forms of governance, but are able to 
demonstrate that the relative balance between forms of governance varies between 
countries. They show that the specific configuration of particular governance 
practices shapes the scope for action and agency of the medical profession.
Although these studies take different perspectives, and vary in their focus, both 
highlight the changing role of the state and the intersections between different 
governance practices. Clarke (2004: 25) argues for a more ‘conjunctural’ analysis 
in order to explore the ‘unsettled formations’ that can explain the connectedness 
between different levels of governance: ‘This implies exploring how a specific 
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moment is shaped by multiple and potentially contradictory forces, pressures 
and tendencies’ (Clarke, 2004: 25). This author highlights that changing welfare 
state policies are attempts to institutionalise new political-cultural formations and 
naturalise them as the ‘best’ way of doing welfare. These attempts:
bump into ‘old’ or residual meanings, commitments and institutions and 
are engaged by alternative emergent meanings.... These ‘old’ or ‘residual’ 
conceptions coexist – in a more or less conflicting way – with current 
dominant projects to reform nation, state and welfare. They form blockades 
or interruptions that the dominant strategies of reform and modernization 
have to overcome. (Clarke, 2004: 25, 29)
Within the health policy process, professional self-regulation is one key arena where 
such blockades and interruptions play out. At the same time, as Stacey (1992) has 
noted, the self-regulatory capacity of the medical profession may act as a ‘buffer’ 
against social conflict as an intermediatory institution, thus indirectly serving the 
interests of government. Indeed, a number of scholars of the professions have pointed 
to the ‘dualism’ between self-interest and altruism in professional behaviour (Saks, 
1999) and the position of the professions as both ‘servants’ and ‘officers’ of welfare 
states (Bertilsson, 1990). These notions direct our attention towards the state–
profession relationship and the position of the medical profession within particular 
stakeholder arrangements in healthcare. The concept of governance, therefore, 
needs further investigation to include the regulatory power of professionalism and 
to see self-regulation as a particular form of governing health professionals and in 
consequence the organisation and delivery of services.
For our purpose, we expand the concept of governance to specify the role of the 
professions in the governance process. We draw, first, on Burau’s (2005) model of 
‘actor-centred governance’, which links professional action and agency to institutions; 
and, second, on Carmel and Papadopoulos’s (2003) notion of ‘operational policy’, 
which is defined as the organisational arrangements and procedures for policy 
delivery and the particular ‘mode of doing policy’. Carmel and Papadopoulos 
(2003: 32) argue that ‘the analytical power of the concept of governance is that it 
allows enough flexibility to separately analyse both formal and operational policy 
while simultaneously highlighting their unity’. In healthcare the ‘operational policy’ 
and the ‘modes of doing policy’ are shaped by the self-governing capacity of the 
medical profession and the ways the state has delegated regulatory tasks to particular 
institutional actors. Thus, the configuration of the state–profession relationship is 
an arena in which to observe intersecting governance practices and ‘unsettlements’ 
in action.
The novel feature of our model is the integration of ‘self-regulation’ – the core 
of professionalism and medical power – into a changing architecture of governance 
in healthcare. The conceptualisation of self-regulation as an element of ‘operational 
governance’ helps to avoid a priori and often ideological assumptions about 
managerialism and professionalism as necessarily conflicting logics, and the ‘either/
or’ questions on self-regulation and other forms of governing. For the purpose 
of our analysis, we introduce a distinction between three levels of ‘operational 
governance’:
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•	 institutional/hierarchical governance: the regulatory bodies and stakeholder 
arrangements;
•	 organisational governance: models of governing through markets and managerialist 
strategies that impact at the meso-level of health organisations: either directly, or 
through measures that ‘govern at a distance’ (Miller and Rose, 1990) in the form 
of targets and performance measures; 
•	 self-regulatory arrangements that reflect state–profession relations in a time-specific 
context.
Within the nation state, the ‘unsettled formations’ of state–medical profession relations, 
the latter with its self-regulatory powers, can be assessed empirically through cross-
country comparison. A particular strength of this approach is to place the creation of 
‘new settlements’ within existing configurations of assumptive meanings and interests. 
This allows account to be taken of ‘context’ and ‘path dependency’ in examining 
similar pressures in professional governance without assuming linear transformation. 
To provide an empirical basis for assessing transformations in professional governance 
across the two countries, the analysis draws on studies carried out by each of the 
authors,1 documentary analysis and the work of other scholars.
Policy contexts and drivers for change
In terms of the governance of medicine, both state regulation and self-regulation 
have come under pressure to increase resources for health and raise quality across 
the Western world (Dubois et al, 2006). This has prompted strategies to reallocate 
resources and renegotiate roles. However, policy drivers themselves are shaped by 
the structure and politics of health systems and the politico-economic conditions 
that underpin welfare states. Given the significance of context, here we focus on 
the critical differences between Germany and the UK, although it should be noted 
that following devolution, health policies within the UK have diverged and the 
discussion below refers mainly to the NHS in England.
The structure of the health system: contrasting the models
In terms of macro-institutional structures, arrangements in the UK and Germany 
differ. In the tax-funded system in the UK the state has a key role in determining 
the quantum of resources allocated to healthcare through the Treasury, while the 
Department of Health sets policy for the NHS across the spectrum of care, free 
for all citizens at the point of access. The state has exercised control through the 
nationalisation of hospitals and a standardised system of primary care where patients 
are registered with a general practitioner who refers on, as necessary, to secondary 
care. Annual resource allocations are made through the Department of Health to 
local-level health authorities, now healthcare trusts, and through policy prescriptions 
for service development. The state also sets the level of supply for many health 
professionals, including doctors. Historically, compared to other European Union 
countries, the proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) devoted to health 
annually and the ratio of doctors to population has been low (OECD, 2007). Within 
the NHS, which provides around 90% of healthcare, doctors are either employees 
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of health trusts or are in primary care working under contract. Until the 1990s, 
centralised policy making was combined with medical autonomy in clinical decision 
making and through self-governing institutions.
In Germany the state has established a legal framework for collecting and 
distributing funds for healthcare, but the responsibility for administration and 
decision making is delegated to a network of ‘public law institutions’ (Moran, 1999) 
with the Associations of SHI Physicians and SHI funds as the two pillars of ‘joint 
self-administration’. This network structure characterises SHI care with statutory 
powers to regulate the organisation of healthcare and distribution of resources. The 
ratio of doctors to population and healthcare expenditure are high compared to 
other European Union	countries, and staffing levels are almost twice those of the 
NHS (Maynard and Street, 2006; Blank and Burau, 2007). Roughly 50% of doctors 
are self-employed, office-based generalists and specialists, while most others are 
salaried employees in hospitals. Rationing and waiting lists were until recently an 
exception rather than a rule, and free choice of providers is culturally valued and 
a taken-for-granted right. 
One consequence of this form of corporatism, itself a response to a fear of 
centralisation experienced under the Nazi regime, is the absence of uniform 
regulation of provider organisations. The various sectors and occupational groups 
are poorly coordinated. Ambulatory care, where corporatism is especially strong, is 
provided by office-based generalists and specialists and overseen by SHI institutions 
at both national and regional level; and hospital care is under the authority of the 
Länder. A second consequence of corporatism is that policy initiatives, including 
policies for Europe, have a limited impact. For instance, the recent European Working 
Time Directive does not affect the organisation of ambulatory care as doctors are 
mainly self-employed. In this article, we focus on ambulatory care as this forms 
the ‘core’ of corporatist regulation, and demonstrates the linkage between state 
and professional power (see Moran, 1999; European Observatory on Health Care 
Systems, 2000; Freeman, 2000; Dent, 2003). 
There are important differences in the form of self-governance of the medical 
profession in the two countries although, in both, medicine has a monopoly of 
particular functions. In the UK, medicine became a self-governing profession prior 
to the welfare state, and the profession has regulated standards and performance 
through membership bodies. Under state licence, the General Medical Council 
(GMC) has the sole authority to register doctors and to remove from the register 
those whose performance has ‘brought the profession into disrepute’ through 
disciplinary procedures. Together with other specialist institutions, it oversees 
professional education and in recent decades has played a major role in setting 
standards. Within the NHS, doctors maintained dominance in clinical decision 
making and in local governance institutions. At the level of central policy making, 
doctors safeguarded terms and conditions of service through an elite corporatist 
politics, termed by Klein (1990) ‘the politics of the double bed’. Until the 1980s, 
the implicit bargain was that doctors rationed access to remain within existing 
resources and that patients accepted long waiting times. This model is being replaced 
by centralised, hierarchical forms of regulation, with the use of more decentralised 
and flexible managerialist mechanisms operating within a quasi-market (Gray and 
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Harrison, 2004; Salter, 2007). Dent (2005: 632) has termed this latter strategy ‘soft 
bureaucracy of enforced self-regulation’.
In Germany, the self-governing powers of the profession developed in parallel 
with the welfare state and compulsory social health insurance was introduced much 
earlier alongside a corporatist and decentralised system of regulation (Bäringhausen 
and Sauerborn, 2002). The arrangements were shaped by a corporatist welfare 
system that dates back to the Bismarckian era and, after the Second World War, by 
external political demands for federalism and decentralisation to mitigate centralised 
state power. This also shaped the position of medicine where professional power 
is exercised through both the self-governing professional bodies, the Physicians’ 
Chambers, similar to the UK, and a range of SHI institutions, that have no UK 
parallel.
Physicians’ Chambers are legally constituted bodies with mandatory membership 
for all doctors on the register (hospital and office-based doctors). They are responsible 
for controlling the standards of professional knowledge and practice through 
overseeing and accrediting specialist training and continuing education as well as 
updating medical ethics. The Associations of SHI Physicians include office-based 
generalists and specialists who provide ambulatory care under the SHI scheme; 
membership is mandatory. They have a monopoly in providing ambulatory care 
and are responsible for a range of economic issues, such as distributing resources 
among generalists and specialists, negotiating fees, and determining the ratio of 
office-based doctors to population across geographic areas. The Associations of SHI 
Physicians and the SHI funds are charged with cooperating to make decisions in the 
public interest. The SHI funds are expected to represent the interests of the users, 
thus counterbalancing the monopolist power of doctors. As a regulatory model, the 
joint self-administration of SHI care embodies ideas of partnership and network 
governance rather than hierarchical steering. It is based on the principle of balancing, 
and curbing different interests – including those of the state. In contrast, within the 
UK NHS, state power and control is accepted and embedded in the centralised 
structure, although critics have pointed to a democratic deficit and currently attempts 
are being made to increase local scrutiny (Hogg, 2007).
Policy drivers for change
Economic pressures have also played out differently in the two countries with 
consequent policy effects. In Germany, economic prosperity with rising incomes 
has allowed the rising costs of health insurance to be met. However, recently 
the economic situation has turned. Falling incomes caused by high levels of 
unemployment and demographic change impact directly on SHI funds. The sickness 
funds, health providers and users all struggle with increasing financial pressures and 
the significant cuts in SHI care. Consequently, cost containment has become the 
key policy goal, with the medical profession, and particularly the SHI doctors, the 
key target group for tighter economic controls (SVR, 2003, 2005, 2007). With a few 
exceptions, the self-governing bodies, such as the Chambers, are unaffected.
In contrast, since the inception of the NHS, UK governments have seen their 
primary role as containing costs and increasing efficiency. By the second Blair 
government, mounting public pressure to improve services, enhance patient safety 
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and increase patient choice, together with economic growth, led to increased resource 
allocation to health although with continuing pressure to raise quality (Maynard and 
Street, 2006). Furthermore, public trust in regulatory systems has been shaken by a 
series of well-publicised cases where doctors have caused serious harm to patients. 
The subsequent public inquiries have demonstrated failures in self-regulation 
and weak links between state and professional regulatory systems (summarised in 
DH, 2006). These have triggered a radical reform process and a restructuring of 
state–profession relations (DH, 2007).
In sum, while facing similar pressures, the peaks of economic prosperity, political 
factors and institutional structures have played out differently. The historical 
trajectories of the NHS in the UK and the Bismarckian model of welfare and 
healthcare in Germany created different configurations of state–profession 
relationships: in Germany, medical self-regulation is an integral part of welfare 
state governance, while in the UK, the institutions of self-governance are more 
separate from government. Furthermore, economic constraints and welfare state 
transformations shape the goals of new health policies in Germany, while in the UK 
the drivers for change are more complex, including economic interests as well as 
democratic renewal. The next section examines how the different drivers play out 
and shape the creation of ‘new settlements’ within state–profession relationships. 
Changing modes of governance and strategies for 
controlling medical work
Governments of both countries have aimed to contain costs while at the same time 
raising the quality of care, adopting a so-called ‘third way’ approach (Giddens, 1998; 
Newman and Kuhlmann, 2007). Both have introduced a form of internal market and 
a number of managerial procedures to change the behaviour of the major players 
in healthcare. In consequence, existing systems for healthcare delivery are subject 
to continuing organisational change and are moving towards ‘hybrid’ forms of 
governance and healthcare finance (Lewis et al, 2006; Blank and Burau, 2007). These 
‘hybrids’ shall be unpacked and explored in greater detail in the following sections, 
using the three levels of ‘operational governance’ as a framework for comparison.
Transformations of regulatory bodies
In Germany, the 2004 Health Reform Act extended the key regulatory body of 
SHI care, now the Federal Commission (Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss) (see Table 1). 
The intention is to link the different regulatory systems of ambulatory and hospital 
care and include representatives of user groups. Although SHI care is no longer 
solely governed by a ‘monolith’ of sickness funds and physicians’ associations, the 
expansion of stakeholders and the introduction of new players is limited and service 
coordination underdeveloped (SVR, 2005). In contrast, a number of new arm’s-
length regulatory bodies have been established in the UK, which attempt to ensure 
that doctors and managers follow practices leading to more cost-effective care (see 
Table 1). The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) (covering 
England and Wales), responsible for appraising and producing guidance on the cost-
effectiveness of new and existing technologies, in particular, has gained international 
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significance as a pioneer in assessing treatment regimes and disseminating evidence-
based practice (Concentin et al, 2006). It also recommends clinical guidelines for 
practice and assesses audit methods. It has developed and supported methods to obtain 
evidence from patients of their experiences and consults with user representatives 
(Davies et al, 2006). NICE does not itself make decisions about which treatments 
should be funded but makes recommendations to the Department of Health, which 
in turn issues guidance that may be mandatory. 
Table 1: Transformations of regulatory bodies in the UK and Germany 
Transformations UK Germany
Regulatory	bodies	 Nine	councils	governing	the	
health	professions	(UK);	
Council	for	Healthcare	
Regulatory	Excellence	(UK)
Restructuring	of	the	Federal	
Committee,	inclusion	of	user	
representatives	and	the	German	
Hospital	Society;	new	bodies	in	the	
context	of	disease	management	
programmes;	inclusion	of	user	
representatives;	a	number	of	new	
expert	groups
New	agencies	of	
public	control
NICE	(England	and	Wales);	
National	Patient	Safety	
Agency	(England,	Wales	and	
NI);	Healthcare	Commission	
(England)
Institute	of	Quality	and	Efficiency	in	
Healthcare;	main	goal	is	to	improve	
evidence-based	patient	information
Stakeholder	
arrangements
Inclusion	of	the	service	
users	and	new	forms	of	
more	active	involvement	in	
the	policy	process;	more	lay	
members	on	professional	
councils,	associations	and	
regulatory	bodies;	a	range	
of	regulatory	bodies	of	
various	professional	groups;	
new	bodies	that	coordinate	
activities
Inclusion	of	the	service	user	
alongside	the	principle	of	delegation	
of	user	interests	to	the	SHI	funds;	
exclusion	of	the	health	occupations	
from	the	regulatory	bodies;	no	
statutory	recognition	as	a	profession;	
lack	of	coordination	of	services
In Germany, efforts to improve standardisation and control of healthcare decisions 
have not been developed institutionally to the same extent. In 2004, an ‘Institute 
of Quality and Efficiency in Healthcare’ was established as part of the SHI system. 
Headed by a physician, its main task is to provide safe, evidence-based information 
for patients. This maintains medical control and is less transparent and publicly 
accountable than, for example, NICE and it does not involve consumer groups. 
In effect in Germany, delegation of responsibility for policy making and financial 
distributions to the SHI system releases the state from the burden of costs and thus 
explains the lack of state activity in this sphere. 
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Differences in the stakeholder arrangements are especially strong when it comes 
to the entire health workforce. In Germany, health occupations apart from the 
medical and dental profession are excluded from decision-making arenas and are 
denied the statutory rights of a profession – except psychotherapists who are now 
included in the Associations of SHI Physicians and apply a position in the middle 
range (European Observatory on Health Care Systems, 2000). This is in sharp contrast 
to the developments in the UK where currently nine regulatory bodies cover an 
expanding range of health professions (Allsop and Jones, 2006, 2008). Statutory 
recognition and a comprehensive jurisdiction provide the opportunity for a range 
of health professions to act as independent players, counterbalancing the medical 
view and medical interests.
New forms of organisational governance: marketisation and performance management
Marketisation and managerialist strategies have become the cornerstones of new 
governance. In the UK, in the early 1990s an internal market was introduced in the 
NHS. The aim was to split the functions of purchasing and providing and introduce 
service pricing. Purchasers now commission services for populations, and prioritise 
services within a given budget; providers compete for contracts on the basis of cost 
and quality. Most recently, in order to increase the extent of provider cooperation 
and the coordination of services across health and social care, mergers between 
commissioning agencies, the primary care trusts, are taking place at the meso-level 
(Sheaff et al, 2004). A more pluralist supply system using the private sector has been 
encouraged, with the objective of increasing competition and widening choice 
for patients (DH, 2004). Private finance has been sought for NHS facilities and 
foundation trusts, hospitals within the NHS with greater financial freedom to raise 
funds, have been established (Allsop and Baggott, 2004).
In Germany, a series of reform acts demonstrates a commitment to innovation in 
the health system, which, unlike the NHS, already had a purchaser–provider split. 
Similar to the UK, policy incentives are shaped by competition and marketisation 
and focus on financial incentives (Glaeske et al, 2001). However, while the NHS 
is currently expanding its funding base and services, the coverage of SHI care is 
increasingly limited through the exclusion of several services. This is coupled with 
an erosion of the principle of solidarity in SHI funding. Co-payments by patients 
have been introduced and the users of healthcare services are burdened increasingly 
with additional out-of-pocket expenses. The 2000 Health Reform Act launched 
pilot projects on different ways of contracting and introducing structural change, 
but studies suggest that the projects have largely failed to contain costs and improve 
quality (Tophoven, 2003). Following this experience, more complex strategies were 
developed with incentives for organisational change, such as new forms of flexible 
contracting and pilot projects to introduce office-based generalists as gatekeepers 
(Hausarztmodelle). However, participation is voluntary for both providers and users 
(Kuhlmann, 2006).
Another cornerstone of the new governance practices is the focus on standard 
setting and guidelines to govern professional performance with varying forms of 
sanction for non-compliance held by different players. In the UK, one method 
has been for state-sponsored agencies to draw on different forms of expertise (for 
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example, clinicians and service users) to make recommendations for policy. NICE 
is an example already mentioned (Davies et al, 2006). Another example is the policy 
guidance for the treatment of particular illnesses or client groups contained in 
the National Service Frameworks (NSFs). These have been drawn up by working 
parties composed of various interests reflecting a more plural approach to policy 
making. This contrasts with the medically dominated, secretive and elitist bargaining 
of the past. The process allows the state to gain legitimacy, yet maintain a veto and 
play off interests while also controlling implementation at the meso-level. This is 
achieved through setting performance targets for managers and carrying out audit 
and inspection through arm’s-length bodies such as the Healthcare Commission, 
which benchmarks standards and publicises outcomes.
In Germany, disease management programmes (DMPs) for chronic illnesses are the 
clearest sign of intervention in the SHI system (Pfaff et al, 2003). First introduced in 
2002, DMPs are shaped by the politics of cost containment and financial incentives 
for both the SHI funds and doctors. They are coupled with the Risk Equation 
Scheme for SHI funds, and evaluations focus on the financial effects only. Although 
the programmes attempt to improve quality of care through the standardisation of 
treatment, they do not establish a coherent system of target setting, monitoring and 
evaluation with benchmarks, and do not encourage providers to use quality measures 
to compete for patients (Kuhlmann, 2006). These strategies remain underdeveloped 
(SVR, 2000/01), and there are few sanctions against those who provide a poor quality 
of care (Sauerland, 2001). Although data collected by the medical profession and the 
SHI funds are now more extensive, for instance hospitals produce reports on the 
quality of care, there is opposition to benchmarking standards. Both parties express 
concern about the validity of data and the opportunities for misuse, arguments also 
made by the medical elites in the UK, but overridden by government. In Germany, 
the alliance between doctors and sickness funds, and the absence of powerful external 
players allow interest-based strategies to prevail.
A further example of state-led supply-side changes in the UK NHS are policies 
geared to changing the distribution of tasks between health professionals and 
introducing a greater ‘skill-mix’ in care. Policies for new forms of human resource 
management and professional development are aspects of ‘operational governance’ 
at the interface of organisations and professions. For instance, some nurses and 
pharmacists have enhanced roles in diagnosing and prescribing for a specific range of 
conditions. A large and diverse workforce of health support workers has developed 
(Saks and Allsop, 2007) and there is a drive to integrate care through multiprofessional 
teamwork both in the community and in hospital settings. Integrated care models 
and greater cross-service coordination are also policy goals in Germany, but the 
effect has been limited (SVR, 2005, 2007) with only 1% of the SHI budget allocated 
for integrated care (Greß et al, 2006). In Germany, integration refers to cooperation 
between office-based generalists and specialists, and between ambulatory and hospital 
care, rather than doctors working with other health professions. This is in sharp 
contrast to the UK where interprofessional working, particularly across the health 
and social care divide, is a priority. 
In summary, a major factor in explaining these different policy priorities is the 
relative powers of policy actors within the health system. In Germany, the governance 
of medical performance is mainly exercised within the SHI system and outcomes 
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depend on negotiations between doctors and sickness funds; policy incentives focus 
on initiatives by the medical profession and on financial controls. By contrast, within 
the NHS there are centralised initiatives for workforce planning and measures to 
encourage the integration of health and social care as well as the financial incentives 
to substitute less well-paid staff for more highly-paid professionals. There are also 
more complex institutions and procedures for defining and monitoring standards 
and weighing the ‘evidence’ for treatment interventions.
Transformations in professional self-regulation
In both the UK and Germany, changes in the forms of professional governance 
challenge traditional relationships between key policy players, although in different 
ways. In the UK at the macro-level, the institutionalised corporatism of the old 
NHS has been replaced by policies that are state led and follow government 
priorities. Elite doctors are drawn into the policy process but more often as experts 
contributing their knowledge (as in NSFs), and less often as negotiators to support 
narrow professional interests (Allsop and Baggott, 2004).
At the meso-level of management within the NHS, government-driven managerial 
imperatives take precedence over claims based on the knowledge and expertise of 
doctors through various forms of clinical governance. Financial and other constraints 
have led to a loss of medical autonomy in treating patients in the hospital in the 
manner, time and place of the doctor’s choosing. The other side of the coin is that 
there are limits to the regulatory reach of the new measures. Some studies have 
indicated resistance (Hunter, 2006; McDonald et al, 2006; Salter, 2007; Waring, 2007) 
as well as ‘gaming’ to reach the targets set by government in response to what Germov 
(2005) calls ‘hyper-rationality’. The loss of autonomy may be balanced by financial 
gains as NHS doctors are more highly paid than doctors in other European countries. 
General practitioners who manage their practices well, have made financial gains 
from new contracts as have hospital doctors, who can also combine NHS work with 
private practice (Maynard and Street, 2006). In Germany, by contrast, office-based 
doctors struggle with the ongoing cuts in SHI care and the 2006 strikes by hospital 
doctors are proof of an increasing dissatisfaction (Janus et al, 2007).
In the UK, following the Shipman Inquiry (2004) into serial killer, general 
practitioner, Harold Shipman, the proposed reforms to the institutions of professional 
self-governance mark a new phase in state–profession relations. One consequence has 
been closer cooperation between state agencies and the professional bodies to identify 
and deal with poorly performing doctors, for example through the National Patient 
Safety Agency. Currently in the implementation phase, but accepted by medical 
elites, are proposals that will transform the architecture of professional governance 
to achieve greater public accountability. There is to be an appointed rather than 
an elected GMC with a lay majority; an independent tribunal to adjudicate on 
disciplinary cases; and an introduction of systems to assess physicians’ continuing 
fitness to practise. There will be regular relicensing of all doctors based on employer 
appraisal, and the periodic recertification of specialists led by the Royal Colleges 
but undertaken locally (DH, 2006, 2007). In response, professional governance 
networks have strengthened; leadership roles for specialty institutions are more 
clearly articulated; and there is ongoing public debate on a ‘new professionalism’ 
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that redefines professional knowledge, standards and engagement with patients in 
the contemporary context (Royal College of Physicians, 2005; GMC, 2007). 
In Germany, there are currently no signs of such radical state interventions, 
but bottom-up changes and redefinitions of professionalism can be observed that 
include performance management, clinical guidelines and networking. An emerging, 
locally based network culture may support more cooperative working styles and 
the medical profession has developed its own strategies to enhance the quality of 
care. In recent years, community-based, loosely linked working groups and ‘quality 
circles of physicians’ have sprung up rapidly. After an initial phase of scepticism, the 
medical profession has embraced the language of evidence-based medicine and 
quality management (Hasenbein et al, 2005). Continuing education has become 
mandatory and is controlled by the profession. Credit points, for instance, can be 
earned by participation in quality circles (Kuhlmann, 2006).
Although professionalism is being redefined in both the UK and Germany, 
there are crucial differences in the agency exercised by the medical and other 
health professions. In the UK, change has been state led, while in Germany, the 
configuration of SHI regulation with the two pillars of sickness funds and physicians’ 
associations provides the space to bypass public control and to form both strategic 
and opportunistic alliances. The debate on a mechanism for benchmarking care 
highlights how the interests of different players converge to create a barrier to 
change and transparency. This was especially evident in the process of negotiating the 
DMPs: both the SHI funds and physicians had an interest in avoiding competition 
and therefore blocked the attempts to establish a comprehensive benchmarking 
system (Kuhlmann, 2006; Burau and Vrangbæk, 2008). The corporatist arrangement 
can also act as a barrier to the inclusion of new services and provider groups. For 
example, in 2004 the integration of acupuncture into SHI care was the subject of 
negotiations within the Federal Committee but reimbursement from the funds 
for this work was rejected. In the event, doctors increasingly offer acupuncture 
but patients must pay for the service themselves. If SHI funds were to cover the 
service, it would be contrary to the medical interest as fees would be fixed and the 
service more regulated. Equally, it is in the interest of government and SHI funds 
to contain costs by blocking new services even if there is a demand from patients 
(Kuhlmann, 2006).
In summary, barriers to governing medical performance are embedded in policy 
frameworks and are not simply an outcome of the self-regulatory powers of doctors. 
In Germany, the medical profession and SHI funds may form temporary alliances 
to avoid transparency, and the politics of cost containment may meet with medical 
interests to exclude new players and services. In the UK by contrast, change has 
been state led, pressures for greater accountability, transparency and democratic 
renewal are stronger and the professionalisation and statutory recognition of a range 
of health professions more advanced.
What matters in the changing architecture of health 
professional governance?
This article has set out to compare transformations in professional self-regulation 
in healthcare through the lens of governance theory. The UK and Germany have 
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provided a case study of how similar policy drivers and strategies play out in the 
differing architecture of governance and customary practices in state–profession 
relations. We have suggested expanding the concept of governance in ways that, 
first, include self-regulation as one element of ‘operational governance’ in healthcare 
existing alongside new organisational governance practices, and, second, link 
institutional arrangements to actors and agency.
Placing professional self-regulation in the wider architecture of changing 
governance practices brings into focus the significance of nation-specific 
configurations of state–profession relationships. In both the UK and Germany, new 
regulatory bodies and new forms of managing medical performance have been 
established that challenge customary interpretations of professional self-regulation, 
leading to a reassessment of what constitutes professionalism in the contemporary 
context. Nevertheless, national regulatory frameworks and interest-based politics 
are shaping how accommodations are reached. In Germany, the state has delegated 
power and responsibility for the organisation and delivery of healthcare. The self-
regulatory capacity of medicine is integrated institutionally as a cornerstone of the 
self-administered SHI system. This network-based regulatory framework creates 
a paradoxical situation. Despite a shift in the overall balance of power towards 
the sickness funds and a more interventionist state, in practice this has provided a 
number of opportunities to reaffirm medical dominance in the policy process. The 
corporatist rearrangement tends to act as a barrier to both greater public control 
and the entry of new players, such as other health professionals who may challenge 
medical power.
In the UK, the state has policy oversight of the organisation of care; the supply 
system is more integrated both in terms of the primary–secondary care divide and 
between health and social care. Hierarchical state-led governance over health policy 
has strengthened in the NHS in ways that have fractured customary forms of state–
profession bargaining and the state has engaged a broader range of players in steering 
policy goals. Although state–profession relationships are more strongly controlled 
by an interventionist state, stakeholder arrangements are increasingly plural. These 
developments have combined to produce a radical expansion of network-based 
and meso-level governance practices. The various arenas of governance create a 
possibility for ‘new settlements’ (Clarke, 2004). Medical dominance thus struggles 
to assert itself on a number of ‘different fronts’. How these developments play out 
in future will depend on how various stakeholders exercise their powers. 
In sum, our analysis suggests that transformations in medical self-regulation 
strongly intersect with other forms of governance, sometimes with effects that are 
unintended or contradictory. An understanding of the changing ‘architecture’ of 
different governance practices requires an assessment of multiple levels of governance 
and how they intersect, and how they	 allow for new ‘formations’ in the health 
policy process. To this end, the concept of governance provides opportunities for a 
more context-sensitive comparison of how new health policies play out in different 
national contexts.
Note
1 Data were drawn from: a study on the modernisation of healthcare in Germany 
using document analysis, a survey of office-based physicians and interviews and focus 
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groups with a range of health professionals (Kuhlmann, 2006); UK studies on NHS 
modernisation processes based on document analysis (Allsop and Baggott, 2004); and 
medical regulation in an international context based on document analysis and expert 
interviews (Allsop and Jones, 2006, 2008).
References	
Allsop, J. and Baggott, R. (2004) ‘The NHS in England: from modernisation to 
marketisation?’, Social Policy Review, vol 16: 29–44.
Allsop, J. and Jones, K. (2006) ‘The regulation of health care professions: towards 
greater partnership between the state, professions and citizens in the UK’, 
Knowledge, Work and Society, vol 4, no 1: 35–57.
Allsop, J. and Jones, K. (2008) ‘Protecting patients: international trends in professional 
governance’, in E. Kuhlmann and M. Saks (eds) Rethinking professional governance: 
International directions in healthcare, Bristol: The Policy Press, pp 15–28.
Allsop, J. and Saks, M. (2002) ‘Introduction’, in J. Allsop and M. Saks (eds) Regulating 
the health professions, London: Sage Publications, pp 1–16.
Bäringhausen, T. and Sauerborn, R. (2002) ‘One hundred and eighteen years of the 
German health insurance system’, Social Science & Medicine, vol 54: 559–87.
Bertilsson, M. (1990) ‘The welfare state, the professions and citizens’, in R. Torstendahl 
and M. Burrage (eds) The formation of professions: Knowledge, state and strategy, 
London: Sage Publications, pp 114–33.
Blank, R.H. and Burau, V. (2007) Comparative health policy (2nd edition), Houndmills: 
Palgrave.
Burau, V. (2005) ‘Comparing professions through actor-centred governance: 
community nursing in Britain and Germany’, Sociology of Health & Illness, vol 
27: 114–37.
Burau, V. and Vrangbæk, C. (2008) ‘Global markets and national pathways of medical 
re-regulation’, in E. Kuhlmann and M. Saks (eds) Rethinking professional governance: 
International directions in healthcare, Bristol: The Policy Press, pp 29–44.
Carmel, E. and Papadopoulos, T. (2003) ‘The new governance of social security in 
Britain’, in J. Millar (ed) Understanding social security: Issues for social policy and practice, 
Bristol: The Policy Press, pp 32–52.
Clarke, J. (2004) Changing welfare, changing states: New directions in social policy, London: 
Sage Publications.
Contencin, P., Falcoff, H. and Doumenc, M. (2006) ‘Review of performance 
assessment and improvement in ambulatory medical care’, Health Policy, vol 76: 
64–75.
Davies,C., Wetherell, M. and Barnett, E. (2006) Citizens at the centre: Deliberative 
participation in healthcare decisions, Bristol: The Policy Press.
Dent, M. (2003) Remodelling hospitals and health professions in Europe, Staffordshire: 
Staffordshire University Press.
Dent, M. (2005) ‘Post-new public management in public sector hospitals? The UK, 
Germany and Italy’, Policy & Politics, vol 33, no 4: 623–36.
DH (Department of Health) (2004) The NHS Improvement Plan: Putting people at the 
heart of public services, London: The Stationery Office.
D
el
iv
er
ed
 b
y 
In
ge
nt
a 
to
: U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f L
in
co
ln
IP
 : 
21
2.
21
9.
22
0.
10
6 
O
n:
 T
ue
, 2
4 
Ja
n 
20
12
 0
9:
35
:4
6
Co
py
rig
ht
  T
he
 P
ol
icy
 P
re
ss
187
Policy & Politics		vol	36		no	2	•	173–89	(2008)
Comparing	health	policy	in	the	UK	and	Germany
DH (2006) Good doctors, safer patients, Report from the Chief Medical Officer, 
London: The Stationery Office.
DH (2007) Trust assurance and safety: The regulation of health professionals, London: The 
Stationery Office.
Dubois, C.-A., Dixon, A. and McKee, M. (2006) ‘Reshaping regulation of the health 
workforce in European health care systems’, in C.-A. Dubois, M. McKee and E. 
Nolte (eds) Human resources for health in Europe, Buckingham: Open University 
Press, pp 173-92.
European Observatory on Health Care Systems (2000) Health care systems in transition: 
Germany, www.euro.who.int/document/e68952.pdf
Freeman, R. (2000) The politics of health in Europe, Manchester: Manchester University 
Press.
Germov, J. (2005) ‘Managerialism in the Australian public health sector: towards the 
hyper-rationalisation of professional bureaucracies’, Sociology of Health & Illness, 
vol 27, no 6: 738–58.
Giddens, A. (1998) The third way: The renewal of social democracy, Cambridge: Polity 
Press.
Glaeske, G., Lauterbach, K.W., Rürup, B. and Wasem, J. (2001) Weichenstellung für 
die Zukunft – Elemente einer neuen Gesundheitspolitik, Gutachten, Berlin: Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung.
GMC (General Medical Council) (2007) Good medical practice, Manchester: GMC.
Gray, A. and Harrison, S. (eds) (2004) Governing medicine: Theory and practice, Milton 
Keynes: Open University Press.
Greß, S., Focke, A., Hessel, F. and Wasem, J. (2006) ‘Financial incentives for disease 
management programmes and integrated care in German social health insurance’, 
Health Policy, vol 78: 295–305.
Hasenbein, U., Schulze, A., Busse, R. and Wallesch, C.W. (2005) ‘Ärztliche 
Einstellungen gegenüber Leitlinien’, Gesundheitswesen, vol 67: 332–41.
Hogg, C. (2007) ‘Patient and public involvement: what next for the NHS?’, Health 
Expectations, vol 10, no 2: 129–38.
Hunter, D.J. (2006) ‘From tribalism to corporatism: the continuing managerial 
challenge to medical dominance’, in D. Kelleher, J. Gabe and G. Williams (eds) 
Challenging medicine (2nd edition), London: Routledge, pp 1–23.
Janus, K., Amelung, V.E., Gaitanides, M. and Schwartz, F.W. (2007) ‘German physicians 
“on strike”: shedding light on the roots of physician dissatisfaction’, Health Policy, 
vol 82, no 3: 357–65.
Klein, R. (1990) ‘The state and the profession: the politics of the double bed’, British 
Medical Journal, vol 301: 700–2.
Kuhlmann, E. (2006) Modernising health care: Reinventing professions, the state and the 
public, Bristol: The Policy Press.
Kuhlmann, E. and Saks, M. (2008) ‘Health policy and workforce dynamics: the future’, 
in E. Kuhlmann and M. Saks (eds) Rethinking professional governance: International 
directions in healthcare, Bristol: The Policy Press, pp 235–44.
Lewis, R., Alvarez, R. and Mays, N. (2006) How to regulate health care in England?: 
An international perspective, London: King’s Fund.
D
el
iv
er
ed
 b
y 
In
ge
nt
a 
to
: U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f L
in
co
ln
IP
 : 
21
2.
21
9.
22
0.
10
6 
O
n:
 T
ue
, 2
4 
Ja
n 
20
12
 0
9:
35
:4
6
Co
py
rig
ht
  T
he
 P
ol
icy
 P
re
ss
188 Ellen	Kuhlmann	and	Judith	Allsop
Policy & Politics		vol	36		no	2	•	173–89	(2008)
McDonald, R., Waring, J. and Harrison, S. (2006) ‘Rules, safety and the narrativisation 
of identity: a hospital operating theatre case study’, Sociology of Health & Illness, 
vol 28, no 2: 178–202.
McKinlay, J. and Marceau, L. (2002) ‘The end of the golden age of doctoring’, 
International Journal of Health Services, vol 32, no 2: 379-416.
Maynard, A. and Street, A. (2006) ‘Seven years after feast, seven years after famine: 
boom to bust in the NHS?’, British Medical Journal, vol 332: 906–8.
Miller, P. and Rose, N. (1990) ‘Governing economic life’, Economy and Society, vol 
19, no 1: 1–31.
Moran, M. (1999) Governing the health care state, Manchester: Manchester University 
Press.
Newman, J. (2001) Modernising governance: New Labour, policy and governance, London: 
Sage Publications.
Newman, J. (2005) ‘Regendering governance’, in J. Newman (ed) Remaking governance: 
People, politics and the public sphere, Bristol: The Policy Press, pp 81–99.
Newman, J. and Kuhlmann, E. (2007) ‘Consumers enter the political stage?: 
Modernization of health care in Britain and Germany’, European Journal of Social 
Policy, vol 17: 99–111. 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2007) OECD 
health data, 2007, www.oecd.org/health/healthdata
Pfaff, H., Schrappe, M., Lauterbach, K.W., Engelmann, U. and Halber, M. (eds) (2003) 
Gesundheitsversorgung und Disease Management, Bern: Huber.
Royal College of Physicians (2005) Doctors in society: Medical professionalism in a 
changing world, London: Royal College of Physicians.
Saks, M. (1999) ‘Professions, markets and public responsibility’, in M. Dent, M. 
O’Neill and C. Bagley (eds) Professions, public management and the European welfare 
state, Stafford: Staffordshire University Press, pp 13–27.
Saks, M. and Allsop, J. (2007) ‘Social policy, professional regulation and health support 
work in the United Kingdom’, Social Policy and Society, vol 6, no 2: 165–71.
Salter, B. (2002) ‘Medical regulation: new politics and old power structures’, Politics, 
vol 22, no 2: 59–67. 
Salter, B. (2007) ‘Governing UK medical performance: a struggle for policy 
dominance’, Health Policy, vol 82: 263–75.
Sauerland, D. (2001) ‘The German strategy for quality improvement in health care: 
still to improve’, Health Policy, vol 56: 127–47.
Sheaff, R., Mashall, M., Rogers, A., Roland, M., Sibbald, B. and Pickard, S. (2004) 
‘Governmentality by network in English primary healthcare’, Social Policy & 
Administration, vol 38, no 1: 89–103.
Shipman Inquiry (2004) Independent public inquiry into the issues arising from the case 
of Harold Frederick Shipman, Chair Dame Janet Smith, Fifth Report, London: The 
Stationery Office.
Stacey, M. (1992) Regulating British medicine: The General Medical Council, Chichester: 
Wiley.
SVR (Advisory Council for the Concerted Action in Health Care) (2000/01) 
Appropriateness and efficiency, Report Summary, www.svr-gesundheit.de
SVR (2003) Health care finance, user orientation and quality, Report Summary, www.
svr-gesundheit.de.
D
el
iv
er
ed
 b
y 
In
ge
nt
a 
to
: U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f L
in
co
ln
IP
 : 
21
2.
21
9.
22
0.
10
6 
O
n:
 T
ue
, 2
4 
Ja
n 
20
12
 0
9:
35
:4
6
Co
py
rig
ht
  T
he
 P
ol
icy
 P
re
ss
189
Policy & Politics		vol	36		no	2	•	173–89	(2008)
Comparing	health	policy	in	the	UK	and	Germany
SVR (2005) Koordination und Qualität im Gesundheitswesen, Gutachten, www.svr-
gesundheit.de
SVR (2007) Kooperation und Verantwortung: Voraussetzungen einer zielorientierten 
Gesundheitsversorgung, Gutachten, www.svr-gesundheit.de
Tophoven, C. (2003) ‘Wandel der ambulanten Versorgung’, in H. Pfaff, M. Schrappe, 
K.W. Lauterbach, U. Engelmann and M. Halber (eds) Gesundheitsversorgung und 
Disease Management, Bern: Huber, pp 87–94.
Waring, J. (2007) ‘Adaptive regulation or governmentality: patient safety and the 
changing regulation of medicine’, Sociology of Health & Illness, vol 29, no 2: 
163–79.
Ellen Kuhlmann, Department of Social and Policy Sciences, University of Bath, Bath, UK 
e.c.kuhlmann@bath.ac.uk  
Judith Allsop, Department of Health and Social Care, University of Lincoln, UK 
jallsop@lincoln.ac.uk
